In the interwar period, Japanese textile firms were able to greatly increase labor efficiency and become the world's main exporter of cotton textiles. Meanwhile, the Indian industry stagnated and was forced to retreat behind tariff walls. This paper argues that the flexibility of the Japanese work force stemmed from its high turnover; the Indian laborers were collectively inflexible in defending lifetime careers against technical changes that reduced labor demand. As the industry requires only a few easily acquired skills, a committed work force was actually a disadvantage to Indian management.
T he history of the international economy from 1860 to the present shows that the major barrier to economic growth in poor countries such as India was not a failure to adopt new technology, but a failure to use it successfully. Technological implants from the advanced countries operated at much lower levels of efficiency in poor countries, a point illustrated by Gregory Clark in an examination of the 1910 cotton textile industry.
1 He argued that efficiency was limited by cultural norms among laborers. This, however, cannot explain the divergent development paths of the industry in two of the countries of his study. In 1920 both India and Japan had low levels of output per worker in textiles. Yet over the next 18 years Japan increased output per worker by a factor of three and thus became the dominant world trader in cotton textiles. India saw almost no gain in labor productivity.
Rather than relying on cultural norms, I argue that the reason the Indian industry fell so far behind is that Indian labor increased the costs and risks of implementing productivity improvements. They believed that any improvements in efficiency meant unemployment. In Japan, in fact, the large increases in production and productivity that occurred between 1926 and 1937 were accompanied by a 17 percent drop in employment.
2 Japanese managers were able to circumvent labor's 308 Wolcott resistance because their labor force consisted of young girls, 15 to 18 years old, who typically stayed in the industry for less than two years. 3 Any improvement in labor conditions would be reaped by subsequent generations of laborers; the strikers themselves would receive little of the benefits despite incurring all of the costs. The Indian laborer, on the other hand, was an adult male who planned to remain in the industry for life. 4 He was willing to endure long strikes hoping to secure future employment and wage levels. In the post-World War II period, Japanese managers have been praised for instituting lifetime employment patterns and investing heavily in worker training. Therefore, it is surprising that the first internationally successful Japanese industry made a virtue out of a lack of industrial commitment.
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INDIAN ATTEMPTS AT REORGANIZATION
Japan's export dominance in third markets such as China, and her encroachments into the Indian market where her piece-goods sales rose 372 percent between 1921 and 1938, offer prima facie evidence of her productivity gains. Keijiro Otsuka, Gustav Ranis, and Gary Saxonhouse offer more direct evidence in the form of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measures. 6 They find that whereas TFP rose 61 percent in Japanese spinning and 77 percent in weaving, corresponding Indian measures only rose 1 and 21 percent, respectively. The increase in TFP in all cases is mainly an increase in labor productivity, as output per hour for a particular type of machine is fixed within fairly small margins. We know from contemporary observers that the reason Japanese labor increased output per hour was that they were required to handle more machines. At the beginning of the period, one spinner looked after one side of a ring frame, and one weaver handled one or at most two looms.
demand as "historically extreme." Saxonhouse, "Productivity Change and Labor Absorption," p. 209. 3 Saxonhouse, "Productivity Change and Labor Absorption." 4 Morris, Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force. 5 Although Saxonhouse and Wright, in "Two Forms of Cheap Labor," point out that high turnover caused the individual Japanese laborer to be less productive at any point in time, they also note the dynamic advantages for the system. They compare the Japanese case, where "the very eagerness of the Japanese girls to leave gave the system flexibility in matters of job assignments and work organization," to the southern United States' use of "men who had invested their identities and career aspirations in their jobs," and had developed "strong notions of appropriate work organization and employer behavior" (p. 28). It is on the concentration of the dynamics of productivity change rather than static comparisons of productivity levels that my study differs from previous ones. Thus, it says little about why the average looms per weaver in the United States was six, whereas that in Britain was four. But given that both industries relied on a committed labor force, it can shed light on why British workers rejected the results of the 1930 Burnley experiment that showed that British weavers could effectively manage eight looms, and why American workers resisted cuts in nominal wages in the interwar period even though the increase in real wages was responsible for underemployment. International Cotton Bulletin and Wright, "Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles." 6 Otsuka, Ranis, and Saxonhouse, Comparative Technology.
These were also the typical machine/worker ratios in India in 1920 India in , as in 1938 But in Japan by 1930, one spinner handled three or four sides, and one weaver handled six plain looms and up to 30 automatics. 7 In a recent article, William Mass and William Lazonick argue that the relative success of Japan was due to management's innovative skills in developing high-throughput equipment that could use the industry's blended cotton. They stress that "planned coordination" simultaneously ensured quality raw materials, well-maintained equipment, and trained personnel. 8 As noted before, however, Clark concentrates on labor. He argues that managerial skill was mobile, and machinery could be and was exported, and so the immobile factor-labor-must explain differences in productivity across countries.
One point that appears to be fairly clear is that technological change in the sense of the development of new machines was unimportant. Gary Saxonhouse found that the age of machinery in the Japanese cotton spinning industry was statistically insignificant in explaining changes in labor productivity. Age of machinery can be taken as a proxy for technical change. The more recent vintage the machinery, the more probable that it incorporates technological advance. Therefore, his finding suggests that technological change was unimportant at least in this important sector of the industry.
9 Moreover, whatever machinery improvements there were originated in the Japanese textile machinery industry, not the textile industry.
10 If Japanese machinists and engineers had adapted Western technology to Eastern conditions, once available, this machinery could be purchased by Indian as well as by Japanese mill owners.
The most compelling reason for doubting the importance of new technology is that when the Indian mills did adopt organizational patterns designed to increase labor efficiency, newly developed machines were not necessary. In 1926, the Sassoon Company began a program to increase the number of machines handled by each worker.'' The mill owner and his technical adviser, Mr. Stone, had studied various systems in the United States, England, and Japan and adopted one that would reduce their spinning work force by nearly 50 percent. No Japanese or other technology that had not been used previously elsewhere was required. Most of the changes were organizational and were aimed toward releasing labor in the final stages of spinning and weaving. The most important step was a concentration of production on the simpler fabrics. Another was the use of higher-quality cotton. The 310 Wolcott main machinery cost was in overhauling the machinery they already had so that the workers' real effort would decrease while machinery per worker increased. The new machinery purchased for the spinning department-a pneumatic mixing plant and an automatic feeder for the blow room-had saved labor in the preparatory stages, but these barely justified the increased capital costs. Their main justification was that they also resulted in a better input for the spinner, allowing for significant decreases in labor in this department. Similarly, labor was actually added to the preparatory weaving processes along with a universal winder. But the labor added received an average monthly salary of Rs.21, whereas the labor released had averaged Rs.42 per month. Labor was added to the winding department to increase the length of yarn in the shuttle. The shuttle held the loom's weft threads. Replacing the shuttle was one of the weaver's main responsibilities. The winding process tripled the length of yarn in the shuttle and so cut the weaver's work by one-third. The mill also instituted a practice of allowing one extra weaver for every 120 looms to run the looms during breaks and to assist with smash-ups. Unskilled labor was hired for carrying the cloth away from the loom. And finally, standardization of output led to one type of warp and weft being used in the shed. This relieved the weaver of thinking when he was gaiting the loom (reloading the warp beam) or replenishing the weft. By 1934 the typical spinner in a Sassoon mill was working four sides of a ring frame (as opposed to the previous one), the typical weaver handled four looms (as opposed to the previous two), and a significant fraction-1,000 weavers-handled six looms.
12 He was coming very close to the best practice techniques in Japan.
In 1953, The Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company hired A. K. Rice from the London-based Tavistock Institute of Human Relations to assist them in reorganizing their weaving sheds.
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The nonautomatic sheds had Lancashire looms that, according to Mr. Rice, were no different technologically than those used in India for 75 years. The experiment resulted in a 50 percent reduction of the work force for a group of 40 looms. Once again, most changes were organizational; only one was mechanical. Previously, there was one jobber for 40 looms, who was responsible for gaiting the looms and supervising the shed, one weaver for each two looms, and one ancillary worker to assist in carrying the warp beams. The weavers' responsibilities-just as in the unreorganized Sassoon mills-were to mind the loom, reload the shuttle, remove the cloth, and carry it to the cloth department. The reorganization led to a head jobber with the same responsibilities as before, an assistant jobber to assist the weavers, eight weavers, and an ancillary worker who now helped the weavers in removing cloth and carrying it away. The one mechanical change was the introduction of a mechanism to stop the loom if a warp thread broke. This mechanism had been developed before World War I. The owners had tried to introduce it before, but the weavers had objected. If a warp thread breaks and the loom is not stopped immediately and the break repaired, there will be a fault in the cloth unless the weaver takes the time to unweave the cloth and repair the damage where it occurred. The weavers preferred faults to stoppages because their bonus for quantity was greater than the fines for faults. One point of the reorganization was to alter this trade-off.
RATIONALIZATION ATTEMPTS AND INDIAN LABOR
Although the above changes were technologically feasible, they were not instituted broadly. The 1934 wage census found that out of the 49 Bombay mills responding (out of 60), only 15 had instituted even partial rationalization, only 29 percent of the spinners were working double sides, and only 21 percent of the weavers were working more than two looms.
14 We can also see this from the individual mill data. Table 1 lists the percent change in the ratio of the actual labor used in the mills to a hypothetical measure of labor needs, assuming manning levels remained the same as the average manning levels in 1920 to 1922. The hypothetical measure was necessary because the Indian data do not distinguish between spinning and weaving laborers. Using data from all of British India, 1920 to 1922,1 ran a regression of labor on working spindles and working looms. (These years are before rationalization schemes were introduced and before the downturns of 1923 and 1925 .) The measure uses the estimated coefficients from this equation and the number of spindles and looms working in each year to approximate productivity constant labor needs. 15 The ratio of actual to hypothetical labor needs should decline over time if labor is used more efficiently. Comparing the average of 1935/38 with that of 1920/23, along with a comparable measure using Japanese data, we see that six of the eight Sassoon mills and a few others show almost as much progress as Japan. But overall, the progress in the island of Bombay is limited.
Mass and Lazonick might argue that the Indians were incapable of implementing these techniques regardless of their access to Japanese machines because of the relatively low quality of Indian managers and their lack of cotton-mixing skills. Clark might argue that rationalization failed because the prevailing social norms in India precluded increasing the workloads. The experience of the Sassoon Company could not completely counter either argument. It was, at the very least, extremely difficult to imitate Japanese techniques. Despite Sassoon's efforts, the firm continued to incur losses until 1935. 16 But rather than an indictment of his management skills, this attests to labor's power to derail a reorganization. In fact, contrary to what Mass and Lazonick might have predicted, the owners of the Japanese mill in Bombay were no more successful than their Indian counterparts. The Diamond Mill, renamed Toyo Podar, had been acquired by Japanese interests in 1926 as an experiment. If the mill was successful, other Japanese investors would follow. Although the mill continued to operate, it remained the only Japanese mill in India. And comparing its ratio of actual labor to the hypothetical 1920/22 labor requirement, the measure stood at 0.79 between 1920 and 1923 under Indian management, and at 0.59 between 1935 and 1938, a difference of only 0.25 percent-better than the Bombay average, but worse than 19 other mills. Another telling point is that in 1927 the mill purchased 200 Toyo Podar automatic looms. 17 Mass and Lazonick point to the development of this loom as one of the key Japanese technological innovations. But by 1934, the mill was scrapping their looms. Even the well-trained Japanese managers with their knowledge of cotton mixing could do little with Indian labor.
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18 That might suggest Clark is correct, except that Bombay labor resisted rationalization not because it violated Indian social norms, but for the much more universally sensitive reason that it involved labor cutbacks.
The new methods were introduced in Sassoon's Manchester Mill in January 1927. The mill had been closed previously, so there was no reorganization, just a new beginning. In July, when the owners tried to extend the system to another of their mills, the Apollo Mill, the workers went on strike and induced the Manchester workers to join them. That strike lasted for three or four weeks. The mill owners then decided to reorganize the spinning sections in their other mills. When they announced their plans, the workers of all mills went out on strike, again for about a month. In both cases, the workers returned on the same terms at which they had left. Finally, in April of 1928, there was a general strike of all textile workers in Bombay that was to last for 11 months in two parts and cost a total of 28.4 million working days. Labor was furious because the techniques Sassoon had been experimenting with were being instituted independently by several other mills-the Toyo Podar mill mentioned earlier, the Wadia group, the Finlay group, and the Kohinoor mill. 19 Of the 17 worker demands, number 7 was "the system by which each worker is required to look after 3 looms or the whole frame (2 sides) [of a ring spinning machine] should not be introduced or continued without the consultation and free consent of the workers expressed through their organisation."
At various times, the workers listed six complaints against the system: (1) physically impossible to work the system without detriment to health; (2) fullest economic benefit not given to workers; (3) unemployment; (4) standard of efficiency of jobbers not improved; (5) insufficient provision for greater facility for technical education; and (6) insufficient provision of proper raw materials. The first point is clearly 17 Pearse, The Cotton Industry of India, p. 125. 18 India, Cotton Textile Industry (1934), p. 57. Clark discusses another case in which Japanese managers were unable to export their managerial success. He finds that although Japanesemanaged mills in Shanghai had manning levels 8 percent below Chinese-managed mills, these levels were still 50 percent above the levels of Japanese mills in Japan. Clark, "Can Management Develop the World?" 19 Newman, Workers and Unions in Bombay, p. 178.
incorrect. Whenever the system was working-that is, the mill was not closed due to labor disputes-there was always demand by some workers for the new, higher paying positions. Nor are points (4) or (5) credible. At the lowered manning levels, the remaining workers were able to make higher wages and the firms' costs were lowered. Though perhaps more efficient jobbers and greater technical education would have been preferable, it was clearly not necessary. This leaves points (2), (3) and (6). According to the neoclassical paradigm, workers have no choice but to accept management's decisions, as indeed management has no choice over what they offer. Profit depends on costs, which are a function of machinery per worker-and so the productivity of the worker, the cost of the machinery, and of cotton. The choice of optimal inputs is complicated. Within a small range, output per unit of machinery and cotton per unit of output are given exogenously for a given type of machinery and output. But there are different grades of cotton, different types of workers, and trade-offs between them all. Better quality cotton is initially costlier but by making the spinners' and weavers'jobs easier may increase their productivity. Cotton of a given grade can also be improved by adding effort in the preparatory stages. By reorganizing workloads, including perhaps hiring additional unskilled workers, skilled workers' productivity may increase. But despite myriad options, economic theory predicts that firms faced with exogenous input prices will find the one unique least-cost mix.
It is not clear that any firm ever faces such clear-cut choices, but certainly the Bombay mills did not. Bombay labor was an actively engaged force, not an inert input. If the approximately 1,000 strikes that occurred in the interwar period were not sufficient proof of this, note that though the Bombay industry suffered consistent losses between 1924 and 1935 despite higher and higher levels of protection, and employment fell 15 percent, the real wage rose (see Table 2 ). In this environment, it is clear that neither wages, the quality of the cotton used, nor the manning levels were the result of the typical optimization process. They were the result of a bargaining process. 20 This constraint is especially binding when new techniques require labor's cooperation. It may be true that with sufficient changes in the preparatory processes and ancillary help, a worker can look after more machines with the same effort as Stone and Sassoon contended. Can and will, however, are not the same things. Monitoring is incomplete in textile mills as in most manufacturing jobs. If laborers did not want the rationalization experiments to succeed, it was well within their powers to make sure they did not. On this point, note that the Bombay workers were asked, not forced, to hold rationalized jobs, and even in the Sassoon mills some operatives "still insist on working on a nonrationalized basis.
21 Although every strike in opposition to the new system "ended in favour of the employers," management could not really succeed without labor's acquiescence.
In India, as in England, wage payments were based on complicated lists and systems of fines and bonuses that, in a not always satisfactory manner, took account of the specifics of the machinery, the quality of the cotton, and the fineness and quality of the output. Unlike England, each of these lists was mill-specific, and they had evolved over many years in response to particular issues. Most innovations in organization or machinery meant the list should be modified as there should be a reoptimization of the payment schedule to achieve the optimal incentive structure. But if labor did not believe that the modifications were in their best interests, they would resist the change. The costs of renegotiation might not be worth the gains of implementing the innovation. Witness the case of the warp stop mechanism alluded to in the 1953 Ahmedabad experiment. Management had been wanting to introduce the mechanism for years; labor had been resisting for years. The necessary alteration in relative bonuses and fines was only made when many issues needed to be renegotiated, and the marginal cost of dealing with this additional issue was trivial. Changing traditional workloads was a large organizational change that required a cooperative work force and a certain amount of trust that the mill owners were not trying to reduce wages in a subtle, underhanded manner. The Indian labor force-perhaps with reason-viewed their relationship with employers with a combativeness and distrust that made changes of any sort, small or large, difficult and costly.
In a declining market, perhaps the most important consideration for the workers was the impact of reorganization on employment. This is suggested by the fact that the bitterest strike of the decade was over the implementation of a system that increased the wage of the average participating worker 30 percent. Although these workers would gain, labor redundancies could be as much as a third of the work force. It is noteworthy that the 1928 general strike began in Sassoon's Jacob Mill, which had the smallest ring frames.
22 According to Mr. Stone, working two sides of a frame in that mill entailed less effort than working one side of a longer frame in the other mills. 23 The demands for high wages if the system was implemented and for excessively high-quality cotton can be seen as ploys to discourage employers from reorganizing as these conditions decreased the benefit of doing so.
Given the potential individual gains, it was clear to labor that they Wolcott would need to act collectively. Thus, they insisted that any change in work conditions must be agreed to by the workers as expressed by their representatives. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to believe that labor represented an organized force. Bombay mill owners complained throughout the 1930s that although labor was restive, there was no one labor representative with whom they could negotiate, and they envied the organized labor union of Ahmedabad. Rather than organized, Bombay labor's action was concerted; cooperation was ensured by violence. Mr. Stone stated that "in at least two mills our workers physically resisted attempts to bring them out on strike in the general strike." Sir Sassoon added that his workers joined the strike because "they jolly well had to." And Mr. Bakhle, the manager of the Apollo Mill, noted that his head jobber left when the three-loom system was introduced "because his own jatwallas and friends would not allow him to work, because he was agreeable to the 3-loom system. He had to run away for his life."
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Fear of imminent retrenchments could not have been the only factor forestalling rationalization. Only Bombay was a declining center; Indian industry as a whole expanded in the interwar period. And yet, the 1934 Wage Census concludes that rationalization attempts were primarily found in Bombay, and Table 1 shows that the regional changes in manning levels are even smaller outside Bombay. Consider the case of Ahmedabad. If Bombay could not rationalize because of fractious labor relations and declining total production, Ahmedabad mill owners faced neither of these constraints. Shortly after World War I, Gandhi had organized the Textile Labour Association and within a few years had won recognition from the mill owners.
25 All disputes were settled by binding arbitration, and although strikes occurred, they were infrequent and of very short duration. The Indian Tariff Board members did not miss this point. When asked why he had not rationalized if Ahmedabad labor was so "contented and happy and has not the ghost of a chance of going on strike," Mr. Kasturbhai, the President of the Ahmedabad Millowner's Association, replied that they would like to but labor feared the associated unemployment. The Tariff Board member pointed out that new mills were being built in Ahmedabad every year. Kasturbhai responded: "We are devoting our attention to it. It is a very big question as far as the labour union is concerned." 26 It remained an unresolved "question" for the moment.
Initially, Ahmedabad mill owners could afford to wait. Wages were lower and workers more efficient than was typically the case in Bombay.
They were able to make large profits with the ever rising protection that the failures in Bombay had elicited. They also rationalized in ways that avoided confrontations with labor. They improved their machinery in order to speed it up and purchased new, longer machines. At the beginning of the period, there were almost no frames with more than 310 spindles for warp yarn or 380 for weft. By 1934, over half of Ahmedabad ring frames had over 380 spindles. Labor noticed the change and complained but did not think the issue was significant enough to strike over.
27 By 1935, however, financial conditions had worsened in Ahmedabad, and mill owners tried to implement a 6.25 percent cut in wages. Workers responded by staging the first general strike since the recognition of the union. It lasted two weeks and costed 94,000 working days. Immediately after the strike, management and labor negotiated the Delhi Agreement in which "the principle of rationalisation is accepted subject to the safeguards that the process of rationalisation would be carried out in such a manner as to avoid imperilling the health of the workers and avoid creating unemployment among the existing employees." Exceptions to this rule were married women whose husbands were benefited by rationalization and persons whose connection to the industry was less than a year's duration. 28 Subsequent to this agreement, rationalization made some limited progress in the spinning divisions, but as we saw from Table 1 , there were no large changes.
29
Rationalization schemes were tried elsewhere in the Presidency with little more success. In Sholapur, a mill tried to introduce double sides for ring spinning and offered a 50 percent increase in wages. There was no response. "It was understood that this was due to jobber's resistance." In another upcountry center, two mills tried to assign weavers more than two looms each, but the quality of production suffered "and the workers also did not take kindly to it." And when a Surat mill was asked if it had tried to improve labor efficiency, it responded that it was doing well financially, "so it has not cared to introduce schemes of rationalisation." 30 This last answer perhaps gives us the most insight into why rationalization schemes were concentrated in Bombay. Changing techniques is a complicated procedure, involving research beforehand and experimentation subsequently. Even without labor's hostility, such an experiment would be costly. But there is no case in India in which labor was not hostile-even in the remote upcountry. That made a costly experiment extremely risky. Improving efficiency meant initial labor problems and continuing monitoring costs. If managers accepted the status quo, on the other hand, they had an opportunity to make very high, virtually risk-free profits. Probably due to the rising protection Wolcott offered them as a result of Bombay's financial troubles, the "inefficient" upcountry mills experienced triple-digit growth of looms and spindles. Under these conditions, as the Surat mill owner stated, they had no incentives to alter their methods.
Amid such widespread labor intransigence, the real question becomes, why were Sassoon and a handful of Bombay firms successful? In the 1934 hearings for extending further import protection to the textile industry, a member of the tariff board questioned a mill owner on exactly this issue.
Mr. Mody: What was possible at a considerable sacrifice on the part of individual mills was not possible for the whole industry, and I think any attempt at introduction of large scale efficiency schemes would have met with absolute failure and ended in strikes. Special provision had to be made in those mills where the efficiency scheme was introduced and there was a good deal of friction before as well as after.
Indeed, the record of labor relations in the Sassoon mills was not smooth even after the general strike of 1928 was settled. Aside from the usual disputes over wages, there was another strike in each mill every time the management wanted to move to a further step in the rationalization process. One 1933 strike in the Jacob Mill over a demand for increased wages also bears mentioning. What makes this strike special is that there were simultaneously several large strikes in Bombay due to wage cuts. That is, in the midst of significant cutbacks elsewhere, Sassoon workers were demanding raises! In fact, the average wage in the Sassoon mills had risen 30 to 34 percent since rationalization began, and labor cutbacks had been kept to a minimum by adding a night shift to absorb the excess workers.
31 Therefore, the hostility evidenced by the repeated strikes was despite management's conciliatory efforts.
Still, Sassoon's experience only shows that the costs were high. It does not explain why, if Sassoon found it to be worthwhile, few others did as well. I believe the answer must lie in the much greater size of the rationalizing firms. The risks of rationalization were large. The potential benefits must have been large as well, otherwise management would not have been willing to offer such substantial wage increases. But the larger the wage increase, the smaller the realized benefit. Note the general rationalization in Japan was accompanied by decreases in real wages. Therefore, contentious Indian labor both increased the riskiness and decreased the benefits of rationalization. What appears to have been a clearly profitable enterprise in Japan appears to have been much more uncertain in India. After all, it was not immediately clear that the mills that did rationalize were models to be closely emulated. Although ultimately they were successful a priori, that would not have been the obvious result. Sassoon, who was one of the richest mill owners with widespread operations in commerce and real estate in Shanghai as well as India, proceeded more rapidly and on a greater scale than any other firm. 32 The others proceeded at a slower pace. But all of the firms that exhibited significant productivity increases were connected to the large managing agency houses. These were the firms that had the financial resources to experiment. Smaller firms simply could not afford to take on labor when the expected benefits were so uncertain.
RATIONALIZATION AND JAPANESE LABOR
We now consider why Japanese labor was so quiescent. The difficulty of organizing the female textile workers is a common theme in Japanese labor history and is often attributed to the natural reserve and submissiveness of Japanese women. Concentrating on the Meiji period (1870 to 1914), E. Patricia Tsunami argues instead that women's inactivity in the labor movement resulted from the constraints they faced.
33 First, because they had only a limited commitment to the industry, they could express their dissatisfaction with working conditions by running away.
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But she also believes that the dormitory system in which the women were housed limited their access to union organizers, and that their seclusion was further exacerbated by the organizers' sexism and disinterest in them.
Many contemporary observers praised the dormitory system. Mr. Kasturbhai believed that the housing with "proper sanitation, etc." was a wise investment. The Japanese workers were "so enchanted by these various little things that were done by the employers, that they were prepared to do any extra work which was demanded of them." 35 Tsurumi sees them in a less benign light. The dormitories, widely adopted around 1900, allowed the mill owners to bring in women from provinces hundreds of miles away. Thus, if there were any labor unrest, the workers would be unable to fall back on the support of their local community as the striking suburban workers had done in the early 1890s. 36 The dormitories also allowed employers to closely supervise employees' movements from living quarters to factory floor, reducing the chance not only of runaways but also of organized resistance. She claims that the employers' motives are indicated by the physical nature of the buildings. 
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The prisonlike function is clear from the construction: generally two stories high, they were built right beside a mill-either within an 8-foot fence that enclosed both the mill and its dormitory or surrounded by its own equally high fence and connected to the mill by an elevated bridge. On top of the fences were intimidating objects like sharpened bamboo spears and barbed wire. Many mills were situated with a water barrier such as an ocean, river, or swamp on one side; others had a moat surrounding the factory building, and adjacent dormitory.
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Andrew Gordon points out, on the other hand, that women organized despite the obstacles. In particular, they were involved in one of the more infamous strikes of the interwar period. It is the exception, however, that proves the rule. At the beginning of the worldwide depression in 1930, the Japanese textile firms were experiencing great difficulties. In an effort to contain labor costs, the major firms dismissed workers, reduced wages, and raised operating speed. Between April and October of 1930, both female and male unionized workers of four of the "Big Five"-the large conglomerates controlling over 80 percent of exports-led nationally publicized disputes. The most important of these was the strike against the Toyo Muslim Company. The dispute began late in September 1930 when the company announced its plans to close a spinning facility and to fire 500 of their 2,350 workers. The workers of this factory went on strike and were joined by those at three other nearby locations. Union cohesion began to break down after only two weeks. By the end of October, 60 percent of the strikers had abandoned the effort. Out of 1,459 striking workers, 6*90 women had returned home-that is, reverted to the earlier response of abandoning the industry. The settlement reached on November 11 was a total defeat for the workers. 38 If this was the most resistance the Japanese women could muster, it showed how little management really had to fear.
Who ultimately made the wiser decision? Were the Bombay workers collectively foolish for undermining the efforts of management? Table 2 suggests that they were not. Although employment fell, it was only 15.1 percent-significantly less than rationalization had threatened. And they were simultaneously able to increase their average real wage 98.2 percent and their nominal wages 13 percent over what can be argued was their next best option-agricultural work in the nearby area. Workers in Ahmedabad and the rest of the Bombay Presidency also did fairly well over the period in terms of employment growth and real wage increase. (There are no data for other centers in India.) It was the Japanese workers who gained least. In fact, the table overstates the gains of the Japanese worker. There was a sharp increase in production and total factor productivity throughout the thirties. Between 1930 and 37 Ibid., p. 132. Note that perhaps because of these restrictive conditions Saxonhouse finds, in the context of estimating hedonic demand and supply curves for Japanese mill workers, that the workers had a very high expenditure elasticity of demand for "unchaperoned hours outside the mill." Saxonhouse, "The Supply of Quality Workers." 38 Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy, pp. 243-45. 1937, however, the Japanese work force fell 5.4 percent; the real wage fell 5.5 percent. And in the Japanese case, the ratio of the mill wage rate to the agricultural wage was virtually constant.
It seems that the Indian mill owners would have been wise to copy Japanese practices and replace their adult male labor force with adolescent females. Given the cultural environment of India, however, this seems to have been impossible. Although some Indian women were employed in the mills, they were typically not girls, but married women with children who, like their male counterparts, planned to be in the industry for life. Gordon notes that similarly placed Japanese womenthose who were employed in non-textile industries and were older, urbanized, and not so isolated-were much more likely to organize than the adolescent mill workers. 39 Again, gender differences are much less important than the degree of commitment to an urban, industrial lifestyle. Indian adolescent females were not part of the out-of-home labor force, nor does there seem to have been a potential to pull them in. In Japan, adolescents of both sexes were typically sent out to work until they married. 40 In India, girls were married in their early adolescence and began bearing children immediately. The usual explanation given for this pattern is that according to Vedic ideals, the female body was 39 Ibid., p. 213. *• Tsurumi, Factory Girls, p. 100-6.
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"reified." Any besmirching of the body was an insult to the entire kin group. Thus, women were never to be allowed out of the home before marriage, when they were delivered to the home of their husband. Although lower-class women were unable to follow these rules perfectly, there seems to have been a hierarchy of nonseclusion: (1) work on your own fields; (2) work on the fields (or in the homes) of someone in your extended family; (3) do work (piecework) in your own home; and (4) leave your home and work for someone else.
41 I have been unable to determine any economic reason for this cultural difference. 42 Therefore, like the mill owners, I must take it as given. The pool of young women seeking short-term employment, which the Japanese manufacturers used so efficiently, was simply not available in India.
CONCLUSION
In the decades between the two World Wars, the Japanese mill owners were able to increase labor efficiency to the point where the average Japanese textile worker neared or perhaps surpassed the productivity levels of the average textile worker in England, which for over a century had possessed the premier textile industry. Simultaneously, the mill owners managed to keep the increase in real wages to only a fraction of the increase in productivity. The Indian labor force blocked productivity-enhancing changes in business practice and still obtained an increase in the real wage. I have argued that this was because the Indian labor force was composed of men committed to the industry for life and was willing to incur the present costs of disputes with management in order to reap gains in the future. The Japanese labor force was more pliable precisely because the workers-young women with very limited commitment to the industry-had no stake in future labor conditions. Implementing technical change is more complicated than purchasing new machinery. Those machines have to be erected in an existing set of institutions. Mass and Lazonick have concentrated on the necessary management skills, but managers are only one part of the equation. It is probable that Japanese managers were on average better skilled than their Indian counterparts. Yet even the best managers of India were unable to achieve the productivity advances of the average Japanese firm. Labor, like management, is a nonhomogeneous input; it has the power to shape, or distort, isoquants in a manner unaccounted for in the typical neoclassical production function.
